W. Brett Wilson’s Steelmaking Coal Case: The Critical-Minerals Debate

Canada’s metallurgical-coal exports were worth C$8.9 billion in 2024. Wilson’s proposal raises a supply-chain policy question—with environmental review and the distinction from thermal coal still essential.

By Justin Plosz

W. Brett Wilson’s Steelmaking Coal Case: The Critical-Minerals Debate
## Key takeaways - Wilson’s proposal asks Canada to assess metallurgical coal separately from thermal coal in the critical-minerals debate. - Natural Resources Canada values Canada’s 2024 metallurgical-coal exports at C$8.9 billion; thermal-coal exports were C$800 million. - The current federal list discussed here contains 34 minerals and excludes metallurgical coal. Export value alone does not establish criticality. - A designation would not approve a mine or remove environmental review. Steelmaking technology and future demand also matter. W. Brett Wilson wants Ottawa to look at coal through a steelmaker’s lens, not just a power plant’s. The Alberta businessman and former Dragons’ Den investor is pressing for metallurgical coal—the coal used in conventional steelmaking—to be added to Canada’s critical-minerals list. His argument brings a substantial Canadian export industry into a policy debate more commonly associated with battery metals, advanced manufacturing and secure supply chains. According to [Western Standard’s October 6 report](https://www.westernstandard.news/news/w-brett-wilson-urges-ottawa-to-list-metallurgical-coal-as-a-critical-mineral/77610), Wilson submitted his proposal through Prairie Merchant Corporation on August 14, as part of the consultation on an updated Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy. The federal [Natural Resources Canada’s request for information](https://natural-resources.canada.ca/science-data/science-research/requests-information/updated-canadian-critical-minerals-strategy-request-information) identifies June 29 to August 14, 2026, as the consultation period. The reporting and the consultation calendar place the submission in that 2026 process. The underlying question is legitimate: if steelmaking coal remains important to industry and some international partners have designated it critical, should Canada do the same? Answering it requires more than changing a label. It means examining supply risks, export markets, environmental obligations and the future of steel production together. ## Steelmaking coal is not the same product as thermal coal The distinction matters. Thermal coal is principally burned for heat and electricity. Metallurgical coal serves an industrial role in making steel; suitable coking coal is processed into coke. In the conventional blast-furnace route, coke provides heat, helps support the furnace’s contents and acts as a reducing agent as iron ore becomes iron. Steel is then produced in a basic oxygen furnace. [World Steel Association](https://worldsteel.org/about-steel/raw-materials) explains that process, while [Statistics Canada](https://www.statcan.gc.ca/o1/en/plus/8704-two-kinds-canadian-coke) distinguishes steelmaking coke from petroleum coke. That industrial function helps explain Wilson’s position. Treating all coal as if it were simply fuel for a power station misses an important part of the supply chain. But the distinction does not make steelmaking coal emissions-free. Nor does every steelmaking route require a coke-fed blast furnace. Scrap-based electric arc furnaces melt steel using electricity, and other technologies are changing how new iron can be produced. ## The Canadian export business behind the argument The economic scale is substantial, but the year and the coal category need to stay attached to the numbers. [Natural Resources Canada’s Coal facts](https://natural-resources.canada.ca/minerals-mining/mining-data-statistics-analysis/minerals-metals-facts/coal-facts) reports that Canada produced 42.6 million tonnes of coal in 2024, with metallurgical coal accounting for 67 per cent of production. It values metallurgical-coal exports that year at C$8.9 billion, compared with C$800 million for thermal coal. Those are separate export categories. The C$8.9-billion figure is not a claim about all Canadian coal exports, Wilson’s own holdings or the value of a proposed mine. The same federal source identifies China, Japan and South Korea as major destinations for Canadian metallurgical coal in 2024, accounting for 33, 22 and 21 per cent, respectively. The industry’s importance is therefore tied not only to Canadian steelmaking, but also to overseas demand and access to export markets. These are 2024 figures—not a forecast or a 2026 sales total. The distinction is important in an industry exposed to changing commodity prices, steel production and trade conditions. ## What Canada means by “critical” Canada’s [current federal list](https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/critical-minerals-in-canada/critical-minerals-an-opportunity-for-canada.html) identifies 34 critical minerals. Metallurgical coal is not included. The [federal announcement](https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2024/06/government-of-canada-releases-updated-critical-minerals-list.html) expanded the list in June 2024 by adding high-purity iron, phosphorus and silicon metal. “Critical,” however, is not simply another word for valuable or heavily exported. Under the federal criteria, a candidate must face a threatened supply chain and have a reasonable chance of being produced in Canada. It must also meet at least one additional test involving economic or national security, the low-carbon and digital transition, or Canada’s role as a sustainable and strategic supply-chain partner. Wilson’s proposal asks Ottawa to assess steelmaking coal through that framework. Its export value establishes commercial significance; it does not, by itself, establish that every federal critical-minerals criterion is met. Equally, the current omission is not evidence that Ottawa has issued a formal rejection of Wilson’s submission. The public list establishes its present status, not the outcome of an individual proposal. ## International comparisons support a debate—not a simple country count There is real international precedent for distinguishing steelmaking coal. The [United States’ final November 2025 list](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/07/2025-19813/final-2025-list-of-critical-minerals) includes metallurgical coal among 60 critical minerals. [New Zealand](https://www.mbie.govt.nz/building-and-energy/energy-and-natural-resources/minerals-and-petroleum/critical-minerals-list/critical-minerals-list-2025) also includes metallurgical coal on its final 2025 list. The European Union identifies coking coal as a critical raw material. Its [2024 Critical Raw Materials Act](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj/eng) distinguishes “critical” materials from a narrower “strategic” category; coking coal is critical, but it is not on that strategic list. The [European Commission](https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en) provides the broader assessment framework. South Africa’s [2025 minerals and metals strategy](https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202505/critical-minerals-and-metals-strategy-south-africa-2025.pdf) identifies coal among highly critical minerals and metals. That wording is broader than an explicit designation limited to metallurgical coal. These comparisons strengthen the case for a Canadian policy discussion. They do not establish a verified total of “30 to 40 countries” with equivalent metallurgical-coal designations. A regional framework, a national list and a broader minerals strategy are not interchangeable evidence. ## Wilson’s industry interest belongs in the story Wilson’s involvement is not only that of a television personality commenting from the sidelines. In an [October 22, 2025 company announcement](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/10/22/3171155/0/en/Prominent-Canadian-family-joins-Valory-board-of-directors-with-8-5-million-investment.html), Valory Resources announced a C$8.5-million strategic investment by the Wilson family and said W. Brett Wilson and Russell Wilson had joined its board. That disclosure should be read accurately: the announcement describes a family investment, not C$8.5 million attributed to W. Brett Wilson alone. It also establishes what the company announced at that time, rather than independently confirming every current board position or ownership percentage. The commercial connection is relevant context for readers evaluating the proposal. It does not determine whether the policy argument succeeds or fails; it makes the interests behind that argument more transparent. ## A designation would not approve a mine Adding a material to a federal list would not be a blanket permission slip for coal development. The government’s [Critical Minerals Infrastructure Fund guide](https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/critical-minerals-in-canada/federal-support-for-critical-mineral-projects-and-value-chains/critical-minerals-infrastructure-fund1/critical-minerals-infrastructure-fund-contribution-funding/applicant-guide-critical-minerals-infrastructure-fund-2025-26-call-for-proposals.html) requires screening, due diligence and funding agreements, and expressly states that an application does not obligate Ottawa to fund a project. Separate [mining and environmental approvals](https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/critical-minerals-in-canada/regulations-for-critical-minerals-development.html) apply to development. The critical-minerals list and individual tax-credit rules are also not identical. Recognition should not be presented as an automatic entitlement to a particular tax benefit, grant or mining approval. That distinction matters in Alberta, where the [provincial government](https://www.alberta.ca/coal-industry-modernization-initiative) describes a coal-policy modernization process and proposed protections. Announced proposals should not be mistaken for completed legislation or project-specific approvals. ## Water, emissions and the next generation of steel A fair assessment must include the environmental questions alongside the export opportunity. Coal development can raise concerns about water quality, including selenium. A [2026 peer-reviewed study](https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.5c10900) examined selenium exposure in fish in Crowsnest Lake downstream of the closed Tent Mountain mine. It provides evidence about a legacy setting—not a finding that every proposed mine will produce the same impacts. Climate policy also has to account for the steelmaking process itself. The [International Energy Agency’s steel technology roadmap](https://www.iea.org/reports/iron-and-steel-technology-roadmap) examines routes to lower emissions, including scrap-based electric arc furnaces and hydrogen-based direct reduction. Those alternatives depend on suitable feedstock, affordable low-carbon electricity or hydrogen, and supporting infrastructure. Their development does not prove that conventional steelmaking coal can disappear overnight. Equally, today’s industrial use does not guarantee unchanged demand indefinitely. The policy choice is therefore not simply “coal or no coal.” It is how Canada evaluates a currently important industrial input while requiring credible environmental performance and preparing for technological change. ## The question Ottawa still has to answer Wilson’s proposal puts a useful challenge before the federal government: does Canada’s current approach adequately reflect steelmaking coal’s role in industrial supply chains and international trade? The strongest answer would be an evidence-based assessment, not an assumption that export revenue alone proves criticality—or that every kind of coal has the same use. For readers, three conclusions can coexist: metallurgical coal is economically significant; international critical-materials designations are real but not identical; and neither a new label nor a strong export market removes the need for environmental scrutiny. That is the substantive debate behind the social-media headline. ## Frequently asked questions ### What is metallurgical coal? Metallurgical coal is used in conventional steelmaking. Suitable coking coal is processed into coke for blast furnaces. Thermal coal is principally used for heat and electricity; the distinction matters when assessing Wilson’s proposal. ### How much were Canada’s metallurgical-coal exports worth? Natural Resources Canada reports a value of C$8.9 billion in 2024, compared with C$800 million for thermal-coal exports that year. Those are historical export figures—not 2026 totals or a valuation of Wilson’s investments. ### Is metallurgical coal on Canada’s critical-minerals list? No. The current federal list discussed in this article contains 34 minerals and excludes metallurgical coal. Wilson is asking for a policy assessment; the article does not report an accepted designation or a formal rejection. ### Does a large export value make a material critical? Not by itself. Canada’s criteria also consider matters such as supply-chain risk and a material’s role in economic security, the energy transition and strategic industries. Commercial importance is part of the debate, not a substitute for meeting the criteria. ### Would a designation automatically approve a mine or guarantee funding? No. Mine approvals and environmental obligations remain separate. A critical designation would not automatically provide funding, establish eligibility for a particular tax benefit or remove the need for regulatory scrutiny. ### What environmental and technology issues remain? The article examines water-quality concerns in a legacy-mine setting, emissions and lower-emissions steelmaking routes. The cited Crowsnest Lake study does not establish impacts at every proposed mine. Alternatives such as scrap-based electric arc furnaces and hydrogen-based direct reduction also depend on suitable feedstock, infrastructure and energy. ## Additional photo credits Elkview coal mine in British Columbia. Photo: arbitragery, [CC BY-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0). [Original photograph](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Elkview_coal_mine_(28880119783).jpg). Resized and converted to WebP; image remains available under its original licence. Blast-furnace iron and slag tapping — illustrative process photograph, not presented as a Canadian facility. Photo: Blast furnace chip worker, [CC BY-SA 3.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0). [Original photograph](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iron_and_slag_tapping_from_a_blast_furnace_tap_hole_%E2%80%94_%D0%92%D0%B8%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BA_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%82%D1%96%D0%B2_%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%B8_%D0%B7_%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BA%D0%B8_%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%97_%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%87%D1%96_1.jpg). Resized and converted to WebP; image remains available under its original licence. Roberts Bank Superport in British Columbia — container facilities pictured, not a photograph of the coal stockpiles. Photo: Ymblanter, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0). [Original photograph](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roberts_Bank_Superport_from_the_ferry.jpg). Resized and converted to WebP; image remains available under its original licence.